
















levels	of	police	 corruption	and	protection	of	 criminal	gangs,	 trust	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	




and	 ‘postneoconservative’	 politics,	 led	 by	 the	 Workers	 Party,	 developed	 governmental	
strategies	and	initiatives	that	formulated	and	legitimized	rich	and	complex	expressions	of	
traditionally	 left‐wing	 politics.	 Despite	 the	 simultaneous	 implementation	 of	 distributive	
policies,	the	increase	of	human	development	levels	throughout	the	country,	the	reduction	
of	 social	 inequalities	and	 the	redirection	of	 the	official	discourse	of	Federal	Government	
security	policies	towards	crime	prevention,	incarceration	rates	continued	to	increase.	This	
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Since	 the	beginning	of	 the	1990s,	violence,	 insecurity	and	criminality	have	been	key	 issues	 in	
large‐	and	medium‐sized	urban	centres	in	South	America.	In	the	case	of	Brazil,	homicide	rates	
have	increased	since	the	start	of	the	1980s	to	an	average	of	50,000	deaths	per	year	and,	in	the	
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that	 the	middle‐	and	upper‐classes	 isolate	 themselves	by	moving	 into	closed	compounds	with	











dictatorship,	 political	 murders	 were	 secret	 acts	 by	 the	 government	 that	 were	 never	 publicly	











safety.	 These	 policies	were	 initiated	 during	 the	 first	 governing	 period	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 Social	
Democracy	 Party	 (PSDB)	 that	was	 led	 by	 Fernando	Henrique	 Cardoso,	who	 governed	with	 a	
coalition	of	center‐right	parties.	The	policies	were	deepened	by	the	governments	of	Luis	Inacio	
Lula	da	Silva	of	the	Partido	dos	Trabalhadores	(Workers	Party),	the	head	of	a	center‐left	coalition.	
It	 is	 possible	 to	 link	 the	 growing	 leadership	 of	 the	 Federal	 Government	 with	 the	 rise	 of	
‘postneoliberal’	and	 ‘postneoconservative’	politics	which,	 led	by	the	Workers	Party,	developed	








the	construction	of	coalitions	 in	a	 rather	heterogeneous	parliament	that	often	 is	based	on	the	
exchange	of	political	favours	and	patronage,	the	fact	remains	that,	since	the	stabilization	of	the	
currency	 due	 to	 the	 ‘Real	 Plan’	 (Plano	 Real)	 in	 1995,	 there	 was	 a	 steady	 growth	 of	 social	
expenditures	by	the	Federal	Government.	Between	1995	and	2010	the	federal	social	expenditure	
more	than	doubled,	from	234	million	Reales	in	1995	to	638	million	in	2010,	an	increase	of	172	


















the	 increase	 of	 GDP	 could	 be	 verified	 by	 a	 heightened	 demand	 in	 unskilled	 labour	 and	 the	
increased	 income	 of	 those	 occupying	 the	 base	 layer	 of	 the	 so‐called	 social	 pyramid.	 This	 is	





















To	 analyse	 the	movements	 of	 criminal	 policy	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 incarceration	 rates	 in	 Brazil	
involves	addressing	the	complexity	of	crime	control.	The	governmental	organs	that	act	within	this	








one	 of	 the	 characteristics	 that	marks	 the	Brazilian	post‐dictatorial	 political	 system,	 especially	
after	the	end	of	the	Collor	de	Mello	government	 in	1992,	 is	the	consolidation	of	a	presidential	
system	based	on	the	development	of	coalitions.	These	coalitions	are	made	up	of	parties	that	exist	
in	 the	 broad	 political	 landscape	 and	 need	 to	 create	 partnerships	 that	 reflect	 the	 majority	 in	


















the	 result	 of	 case‐by‐case	 negotiations.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 government	 to	 control	
legislative	production,	which	 in	 turn	 is	based	on	 the	 interaction	between	 the	Executive	of	 the	
party	 in	power	 to	produce	an	agenda	whilst	maintaining	majority	support	(Limongi	2006).	 In	
other	words,	because	the	process	of	legislative	decision	favours	the	Executive	Power,	objections	





existence	of	a	hypertrophy	or	 inflation	 in	criminal	rules,	which	 invade	areas	of	social	 life	 that	
previously	 were	 not	 covered	 by	 criminal	 sanctions.	 It	 is	 a	 criminal	 remedy	 used	 by	 political	
decision‐makers	 in	 response	 to	 almost	 all	 types	 of	 conflicts	 and	 social	 problems.	 The	 penal	
response	 is	 the	 symbolic	 response	 by	 the	 state	 to	 the	 growing	 demands	 of	 security	 and	
punishment	by	society,	which	are	expressed	by	the	media.	However,	the	response	occurs	without	
measuring	 its	 instrumental	 effectiveness	 as	 a	 means	 of	 reducing	 crime,	 or	 forecasting	 the	















The	 political	 landscape	 starts	 to	 change	 with	 the	 start	 of	 the	 Fernando	 Henrique	 Cardoso	
government	 (1995‐2002).	 The	 National	 Secretariat	 of	 Public	 Security	 (SENASP)	 was	 created	
under	the	Ministry	of	Justice	and	launched	the	first	National	Plan	of	Public	Security	in	2000.	In	









mainly	 comprised	of	 the	Brazilian	Socialist	Party	and	 the	Communist	Party	of	Brazil	 and	was	
located	to	the	left	of	the	national	political	spectrum.	These	parties	prioritised	the	formation	of	a	
coalition	that	aimed	to	implement	policies	to	combat	poverty	and	to	reduce	the	huge	social	and	
regional	 inequalities.	 In	 addition	 it	 increased	 social	 spending,	 implemented	 state‐organised	
income	 distribution,	 and	 directed	 international	 policy	 towards	 greater	 autonomy	 while	
prioritising	stronger	relationships	with	Latin	American	countries	and	other	so‐called	emerging	















reason,	 our	 government	 will	 seek	 to	 establish	 a	 Public	 Security	 System	 on	 a	
national	level.	Social	exclusion,	with	unemployment	as	its	main	expression,	affects	
millions	of	men	and	women	and	results	 in	daily	despair	 for	many	people,	 if	not	
crime.	 The	 statistics	 show	 that	 firearms	 as	 the	 causa	mortis	 of	 youth.	 And	 the	
impunity	 with	which	 organized	 crime	 acts,	 threatens	 to	 compromise	 the	 often	

















continued	 appeal	 of	 consumerism,	 causes	 a	 crisis	 of	 moral	 values	 that	 fuels	
violence.	Both	the	rich	and	poor	are	frightened	and	locked	in	their	neighborhoods	
and	homes.	Forms	of	sociability	for	Brazilians	becomes	increasingly	restricted.	The	
poor	 are	 stigmatized	 as	 criminals	 and	 civil	 coexistence	 is	 threatened.	 The	
organizations	 responsible	 for	 national	 defense	 are	 put	 to	 the	 test	 by	 the	
increasingly	more	insolent	acts	by	organized	crime.	(Workers	Party	2002)	
	






















meant	 that	 the	 development	 of	 knowledge,	 the	 structuring	 of	 research	 networks	 and	 the	
systematic	production	of	data	were	brought	to	a	halt.	However,	this	was	taken	into	account	only	
to	 a	 limited	 extent	when	 informing	 strategic	management.	 The	 first	 agreements	 between	 the	
Federal	Government	and	the	States	to	implement	prevention	programs	and	training	for	public	
safety	professionals	were	seen	as	verification	of	the	progress	of	prevention	policy.	Even	though	





During	 the	 electoral	 process	 which	 led	 up	 to	 Lula’s	 second	 term,	 the	 development	 of	 the	















aimed	 to	 strengthen	 State	 security	 and	 criminal	 justice	 institutions	 and,	 especially,	 dismantle	




Brazilian	 society.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 this,	 three	 basic	 policy	 guidelines	 were	 presented:	 first,	
democratization	and	participation	of	both	society	and	the	state	in	the	management	of	safety	in	an	
articulated	manner;	 second,	 the	 integration	of	 public	 security	 institutions;	 and	 third,	 defining	
public	security	policies	in	scientific	information	and	research	systems.	
	





Grande	 do	 Sul.	 Genro	 launched	 the	 National	 Program	 for	 Public	 Security	 with	 Citizenship	
(PRONASCI)	with	the	use	of	the	previously	developed	plans,	at	the	same	time	bearing	in	mind	the	
complexity	of	the	phenomenon	of	violence,	and	with	greater	emphasis	on	the	socio‐cultural	roots	




The	 PRONASCI	was	 based	 on	 two	major	 principles:	 structural	measures	 and	 local	 programs.	
Among	 the	 first	 structural	 projects	 developed	 by	 PRONASCI	 were	 the	 improvement	 of	
professional	 public	 security	 and	 criminal	 justice	 system;	 the	 restructuring	 of	 the	 penitential	
system;	 and	 the	 combatting	 of	 police	 corruption	 and	 organized	 crime	 and	 the	 communities’	
involvement	in	it.	The	local	programs	that	are	worth	mentioning	are	Territory	of	Peace,	Women	
for	Peace,	the	PROTEJO	and	the	Community	Justice	programs.	In	return	access	to	justice	and	the	






simple	 accession	 of	 the	 States	 involved,	 the	 lack	 of	 adequate	 mechanisms	 to	 monitor	 the	
implemented	 policies,	 and	 the	 abandoning	 of	 the	 planned	 structural	 reforms	 of	 public	 safety	
organizations.7	
	







The	 area	 of	 public	 safety	 did	 not	 receive	much	 attention	 during	 the	 election	 period	 and	 the	
National	Public	Security	Plan	was	not	even	formulated	and	released	until	Rousseff’s	second	year	
in	office.	When	it	did	appear,	it	turned	out	to	be	much	more	discreet	than	previous	proposals	and	









As	 president	 of	 the	 Republic	 Dilma	 Rousseff	 argued	 for	 a	more	 reluctant	 role	 of	 the	 Federal	
Government	in	public	safety	based	on	Article	144	of	the	Federal	Constitution,	which	attributed	
the	responsibility	of	Public	Safety	to	State	governments	with	the	use	of	civil	and	military	police.	











Despite	 the	 simultaneous	 implementation	 of	 distributive	 policies,	 the	 increase	 of	 human	
development	 levels	 throughout	 the	 country,	 the	 reduction	 of	 social	 inequalities	 and	 the	



















































By	 2005,	 after	 a	 period	 of	 relative	 stability	 from	 the	 start	 of	 millennium	 when	 the	 prison	
population	was	around	230,000	prisoners,	 incarceration	 rates	 started	 to	grow	significantly	 in	
absolute	 numbers.	 This	 increase	 of	 approximately	 8	 per	 cent	 per	 annum	 remained	 relatively	























































implementation	 of	 Law	 11.343/2006,	 which	 increased	 the	 minimum	 sentencing	 for	 drug	
trafficking‐related	offenses.	Beyond	the	 increased	sentencing,	 the	 law	had	an	unexpected	side	
effect	which	was	 the	 option	 to	 charge	 under	 drug	 trafficking	 situations	 that	were	 previously	
typified	as	personal	drug	use.	Because	Brazil	has	no	clearly	defined	criteria	 for	 the	amount	of	
drugs	 that	 represents	 personal	 use,	 it	 is	 the	 profile	 of	 the	 accused	 that	 gets	 weighted.	 This	
reinforces	the	selective	nature	of	the	system	and	contributes	to	the	overcrowding	of	the	prison	
system.	The	third	highest	ranked	type	of	crime	is	crimes	against	a	person,	accounting	for	11.9	per	
cent	 of	 all	 sentenced	 prisoners	 in	 2012.	 Crimes	 against	 a	 person	 include	 manslaughter,	








































































be	 observed	 in	 Figure	 6)	 is	 linked	 to	 two	main	 discourses:	 the	 steady	 increase	 in	 preventive	
incarceration	and	the	increasing	criminalization	of	the	drug	market.	These	discourses	have	not	
been	accompanied	by	improved	prison	conditions,	which	in	turn	contribute	to	prison	violence,	





Grande	do	Norte	 (2.3),	Amapá	 (2.4),	Pernambuco	 (2.5),	Amazonas	 (2.6)	 and	Alagoas	with	 the	
record	 of	 3.7	 prisoners	 per	 place.	With	no	 guarantees	 of	 places	 in	 the	prison	 system	and	 the	
growing	number	of	prisoners	each	year,	it	seems	clear	that	prisons	in	Brazil	end	up	assuming	a	
criminogenic	role.	The	prison	system	becomes	a	vehicle	by	which	crime	becomes	worth	the	risk	







The	current	Brazilian	public	 security	system,	which	was	developed	at	 the	start	of	 the	Federal	
Constitution	 in	 1988,	 established	 individual	 and	 collective	 security	 as	 a	 legal	 commitment.	
However,	since	then	Brazil	has	not	been	able	to	confront	its	major	structural	issues	in	the	public	
security	and	criminal	justice	system.	The	divided	circle	of	police	activity	model,	with	the	States’	


















in	 altering	 this	 picture.	 Additionally,	 criminal	 investigation	 is	 a	 highly	 inefficient	 and	
bureaucratised	process	with	a	low	success	rate	for	serious	cases	–	such	as	murder	–	as	a	result.	
Additionally,	the	judiciary	is	slow	and	inefficient	in	guaranteeing	due	process	for	vulnerable	social	
groups	 who	 often	 are	 the	 targets	 of	 police	 selectivity,	 which,	 despite	 the	 steady	 increase	 in	
incarceration	rates,	results	in	a	general	sense	of	impunity	in	Brazilian	society.	Prisons	therefore	
are	 overcrowded,	 dominated	 by	 criminal	 organizations,	 and	 largely	 occupied	 by	 provisional	
prisoners	and	young	drug	dealers.	
	




–	 has	 increased	 and	 now	 accounts	 for	 40	 per	 cent	 of	 all	 prisoners	 in	 the	 country.	 Increased	
incarceration	 rates,	 resulting	 from	 a	 punitive	 demand	 supported	 by	 the	 parliament	 (primary	
targeting)	 through	 the	performance	 of	 public	 security	 and	 criminal	 justice	organs	 (secondary	






Despite	 a	 growth	 in	 recent	 years	 of	 the	 number	 of	 cases	 against	 white‐collar	 criminals,	 the	
increase	has	not	produced	a	significant	change	in	the	profile	of	the	prison	population.	This	profile	
is	still	characterized	by	individuals	with	low	incomes	and	limited	education	and	who,	in	the	vast	
majority	 of	 cases,	 are	 imprisoned	 for	 crimes	 against	 property	 (theft)	 or	 for	 drug	 trafficking.	






‘de‐incarceration’	 and,	 at	 another,	 about	more	 severe	measures	 to	 prevent	 impunity.	 Official	
criminology	thus	becomes	increasingly	dualistic,	polarized	and	ambivalent,	a	fact	that	does	not	
help	the	comprehensiveness	of	some	aspects	of	the	current	situation	of	newly	emerging	public	






candidacy	 represented	 a	 commitment	 to	 arms	 control	 policy,	 by	 focusing	 on	 combatting	 the	
impunity	 of	 crimes	 committed	 by	 criminal	 organizations,	 and	 against	 social	 movements	 and	
human	rights.	These	commitments	on	the	one	hand	encouraged	social	policies	that	would	allow	
for	 the	 reduction	 of	 inequalities	 and	 contribute	 to	 social	 pacification	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
would	improve	the	performance	of	public	security	organs,	especially	the	Federal	Police	but	also	
the	 State	 Police.	 These	 aims	would	 be	 carried	 out	with	 the	 use	 of	 new	 technologies	 and	 the	
creation	of	a	database	that	would	allow	for	the	coordination	of	efforts	to	fight	organized	crime,	
with	 a	 special	 focus	 on	 drug	 trafficking	 and	 arms	 smuggling.	 Based	 on	 the	diagnosis	 that	 the	






knowledge	on	 the	 reality	of	violence	and	crime.	The	aim	was	 to	 fuel	preventive,	 targeted	and	




reforms	 of	 police	 organizations	was	 quickly	 removed	 from	 the	 agenda.	 However,	 there	were	
important	advances	in	knowledge	management	with	the	development	of	research	networks	and	
a	more	 systematic	production	of	 data,	which	 culminated	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	National	
System	 of	 Information	 for	 Public	 Security,	 Prisons,	 and	 Drugs	 (SINESP)	 during	 the	 Dilma	
government.	 But	 that	was	 hardly	 taken	 into	 account	when	 informing	 the	 originally	 proposed	
strategic	management.	Advances	 in	prevention	policies	were	assumed	on	the	basis	of	the	first	










programs	 focused	 on	 conflict	 mediation,	 and	 the	 expansion	 of	 mechanisms	 that	 addressed	
domestic	violence	against	women.	In	addition	the	program	sought	to	qualify	and	valorise	public	






















lacked	 favourable	 indicators	 in	 the	 area	 of	 security.	 This	 was	 influenced	 by	 the	 regrowth	 of	
homicide	rates	and	the	government	followed	the	momentum	to	create	a	resurgence	of	the	law	
and	order	discourse,	 lowering	 the	age	of	 criminal	 responsibility,	 and	 increasing	penalties	and	
other	measures	linked	to	punitive	populism.	With	the	security	guarantee	during	the	2014	FIFA	
World	 Cup	 as	 her	 only	 success,	 the	 candidacy	 of	 Dilma	 returned	 to	 the	 proposed	 idea	 of	







If	Dilma’s	proposal	has	 the	merit	of	 recognizing	 the	need	 for	 the	effective	participation	of	 the	
Federal	Government	in	the	management	of	security,	one	must	recognize	that	little	changes	in	this	
regard.	 Accordingly,	 the	 implementation	 of	 effective	 control	 mechanisms	 of	 policing,	 police	
reforms	and	 the	necessary	 competence	 improvements	of	municipalities	 in	 this	 area	are	often	
being	omitted	from	proposals.	In	fact,	the	police	reform	proposal	might	even	counteract	and	end	
up	 reinforcing	 a	 logic	 that	 does	 not	 question	 the	 issue	 of	 police	 militarization	 but	 rather	
establishes	 a	 new	 model	 of	 police	 structures.	 Neither	 is	 the	 need	 to	 incorporate	 popular	
participation	 in	 security	 management	 promoted,	 an	 idea	 that	 developed	 in	 the	 Cabinets	 of	
Integrated	 Management	 which	 disseminated	 from	 PRONASCI.	 Finally,	 and	 perhaps	 most	







Party	 governments	 contributed	 to	 the	 passing	 of	 tougher	 laws	 to	 combat	 corruption	 and	
encouraged	crime	prevention	policies	by	the	States	and	municipalities.		
	








of	 the	 drug	 market	 in	 the	 ‘hyper‐incarceration’	 nor	 an	 ability	 to	 develop	 a	 proposal	 that	
objectively	 distinguished	 between	 users	 and	 dealers.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 showed	 the	 limited	
capacity	of	left‐wing	Brazilian	politics	to	deal	with	this	issue	and	perhaps	therefore	fell	into	a	trap.	
In	return	for	the	decriminalization	of	personal	drug	use	–	which,	it	has	to	be	noted,	did	not	lead	
to	 incarceration	 before	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 new	 law	 –	 a	 reform	was	 adopted	 that	 hardened	
measures	against	small	drug	dealer	by	increasing	the	minimum	sentencing.	However,	the	reform	
lacked	any	objective	criteria	to	define	offenses,	leaving	the	fate	of	small	drug	dealers	up	to	the	
























accused	 and	has	not	 shown	 to	 increase	 the	 investigatory	 capacity	 of	 the	police.	Michel	Misse	
(2008)	 proposed	 the	 concept	 of	 criminal	 submission	 to	 address	 the	 phenomenon,	 which,	
although	not	new,	is	reinforced	by	contemporary	social	dynamics.	
	















the	 existence	 of	 a	 twofold	 of	 selective	 judicial	 activity.	 Firstly,	 there	 is	 a	 selectivity	 in	 law	
enforcement,	in	which	social	groups	that	are	economically	and	culturally	disadvantaged	are	more	
likely	 to	 be	 sentenced	 as	 opposed	 to	 favouritism	 for	 the	 upper	 classes.	 Secondly,	 there	 is	






dos	 Trabalhadores	 (Workers	 Party)	 in	 Brazil	 were	 losing	 the	 ability	 to	 build	 an	 effective	
hegemony	around	public	security	in	relation	to	the	affirmation	of	rights	and	the	adequate	and	
Republican	functioning	of	the	government	organs	responsible	for	the	police	persecutions.	They	
also	lost	their	political	effect	on	other	areas	of	government,	such	as	the	States	and	municipalities,	
in	addition	to	other	institutional	dimensions,	such	as	the	legislative	and	judicial	powers.	These	
effects	are	crucial	in	order	to	be	able	to	change	the	direction	of	judicial	decisions	and	expand	a	
legal	system	that	is	able	to	restructure	law	enforcement	agencies	and	implement	effective	control	
mechanisms.	This	is	how	we	arrive	at	the	start	of	a	new	government,	still	with	a	leftist	perspective,	
but	with	a	continuous	and	uninterrupted	growth	in	incarceration	rates,	higher	levels	of	violent	
crime,	and	the	resurgence	of	the	law	and	order	movement,	which	threaten	the	few	achievements	
that	have	been	accomplished	and	throw	a	shadow	of	doubt	on	public	policy	in	criminal	matters	
in	Brazil	in	the	near	future.	
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1	Lawyer,	specialist	in	Penal	Sciences	and	with	a	Master’s	degree	in	Criminal	Science,	PUCRS	(Pontificia	Universidade	
Catolica	do	Rio	Grande	do	Sul,	Brasil);	received	a	scholarship	from	CAPES	for	the	academic	CNJ	program.	
2	This	article	was	originally	published	in	Spanish	(available	at	
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/gt/20160404115404/Postneoliberalismo_penalidad.pdf)	and	was	translated	
for	this	special	issue.	
3	For	systematic	and	stratified	study	of	the	evolution	of	homicide	rates	in	Brazil,	see	
<http://www.mapadaviolencia.org.br/>./	
4	About	the	debate	in	relation	to	the	causes	for	the	reduction	in	homicides	in	São	Paulo	over	the	last	decade,	see	
Feltran	(2012)	and	Cerquiera	(2014).	
5	About	the	social	perception	of	the	justice	system,	see	the	recent	trimestral	researches	of	the	Fundação	Getúlio	
Vargas,	which	developed	the	ICJ.	–	Index	of	the	Confidence	in	the	Justice	system	is	available	on	
<http://direitosp.fgv.br/publicacoes/icj‐brasil>.	
6	President	Dilma	was	impeached	and	removed	from	office	in	2016;	this	account,	however,	is	for	the	period	to	2014.	
7	For	an	evaluation	of	PRONASCI,	see	Azevedo	et	al.	(2013).		
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